C. Raja Mohan , 31/08/2010
As China adds a new wrinkle to its Kashmir policy, India will soon have to do a little more than send protest notes to Beijing. If China does not show sensitivity to India’s core interests, the current spat on visas could escalate to a dangerous contestation of mutual sovereignties in the vast and turbulent frontiers that they share.
Beijing's disinclination to host a senior Indian general commanding the northern sector, which includes Jammu and Kashmir, as part of a broader military exchange between the two countries is not the first sign of Beijing's disturbing new approach to the sensitive state.
Beijing's decision to cite the "disputed" nature of the state in refusing a visa to Lt Gen B.S. Jaswal comes on top of the Chinese government's decision to issue stapled visas to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir.
If Indian concerns do not elicit a positive response from Beijing, Delhi will have no option but to conclude that China's new visa practice reflects a significant evolution in Beijing's Kashmir policy.
The very purpose of the military exchanges between India and China, for example, is to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border, pending the resolution of the territorial dispute.
Why then is Beijing spurning military confidence-building to make a political point in J&K? Has the continuous contestation of Indian sovereignty in J&K become so important for Beijing that it is prepared to rupture an expanding bilateral relationship? These are the questions that Delhi is asking itself.
In our obsession with Pakistan and the emphasis on "bilateralism" when it comes to discussing Kashmir, we tend to forget how China looms so large on J&K.
Until recently China's importance to Kashmir was reflected in three facts. China is in occupation of 38,000 sq km of territory in the Ladakh region that connects the original state of J&K with two Chinese provinces, Tibet and Xinjiang.
Beijing also controls another tract of about 5,000 sq km in Shaksgam valley that Pakistan ceded to China under a 1963 treaty. The Chinese People's Liberation Army spent vast amounts of blood and treasure in building the Karakoram Highway through Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan during the '70s.
As it reflects on the recent Chinese moves on J&K, India must come to terms with a number of new trends. As a rising power, China has begun to assert its territorial claims far more vigorously, as seen most recently in the South China Sea.
Its rapid growth over the last three decades has allowed Beijing to project its economic power across its frontiers into the neighbouring countries. As a consequence, China's capacity to influence decisions of its neighbours all along its periphery -- from the Russian far east to Central Asia through the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia -- has increased.
In the last few years, India has warily watched Chinese activism all across the Great Himalayas in Burma, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Pakistan. Until now India's challenge has been about managing an economic and diplomatic contest with Beijing.
The new questions that Delhi confronts are somewhat different. Is China's rising economic power and growing political influence across the Himalayas morphing into a threat to India's territorial sovereignty in J&K? Has China abandoned its three-decade-old cautious approach to J&K?
During the '50s, China avoided taking positions on the India-Pakistan dispute over J&K. Despite the positive Sino-Indian relations and India's acceptance of the Chinese claim to Tibet, China did not support India's sovereignty over J&K. But Beijing did not support Pakistan either.
As Sino-Indian ties deteriorated from the late '50s, China tilted decisively towards Pakistan and after the 1962 war with India it started supporting self-determination for J&K.
As Deng Xiaoping sought a peaceful environment for his economic reforms from the late '70s, the Chinese position on Kashmir acquired some balance, especially after Delhi and Beijing made an effort to normalise relations.
The latest Chinese moves suggest that in the fourth phase of its Kashmir policy, Beijing is less concerned about maintaining a balance between Delhi and Rawalpindi. While its new positions do help Pakistan in a tactical sense, India wonders if China wants to become a full-fledged party to the J&K dispute by contesting India's sovereignty.
Add to this, China's expanding presence in Gilgit-Baltistan, its plans to modernise the Karakoram Highway and link it to the Gwadar port in Pakistan, and its search for new access routes into Afghanistan. All these developments make India wonder if it must redo its sums in Kashmir.
India can certainly retaliate to China's moves on J&K, with visa denials of its own and stapled visas for Chinese citizens from across the borders in Xinjiang and Tibet. Such diplomatic tit-for-tat may make Delhi feel good but will not address its new China problem on its frontiers.
To deal with the rising Chinese power in Kashmir and other frontiers, India needs a long-term strategy that focuses on a rapid upgrade of India's own infrastructure on the borders, massive economic investments to develop the border regions all along our northern frontiers, strengthening cross-border economic cooperation with our smaller neighbours, and modernising India's military capabilities.
For its part, Delhi must first try and get Beijing to see the dangerous consequences of its moves on J&K. India must also offer to engage China in a comprehensive dialogue on stabilising our shared periphery.
From Balochistan to Burma -- through Afghanistan, FATA, Xinjiang, Kashmir, Tibet, Nepal and the Northeast -- there is great turbulence. India's preference must be to cooperate with Beijing in bringing peace and prosperity to this region.
If Beijing, however, continues to challenge India's territorial sovereignty across the Great Himalayas, even a reluctant UPA government -- widely seen as weak and lacking the political will on national defence -- might be forced to pick up the gauntlet.
Source: Indian Express
K.Venugopal
#1
Tuesday, 31 August 2010 10:14:18
To the question as to what India can do about China's aggression on India's integrity, India must immediately and unambiguously put across the message that however powerful China is India shall not go down without a fight and saying so India should deploy its nuclear arsenal upon China with the implication that even if India is completely destroyed, not much of China and its protégé Pakistan would survive either. We must put across the message of assured mutual annihilation. Therefore India has to get cracking on the nuclear arsenal front to hone its nuclear capabilities.
http://news.in.msn.com/international/article.aspx?cp-documentid=4325926&page=0
As China adds a new wrinkle to its Kashmir policy, India will soon have to do a little more than send protest notes to Beijing. If China does not show sensitivity to India’s core interests, the current spat on visas could escalate to a dangerous contestation of mutual sovereignties in the vast and turbulent frontiers that they share.
Beijing's disinclination to host a senior Indian general commanding the northern sector, which includes Jammu and Kashmir, as part of a broader military exchange between the two countries is not the first sign of Beijing's disturbing new approach to the sensitive state.
Beijing's decision to cite the "disputed" nature of the state in refusing a visa to Lt Gen B.S. Jaswal comes on top of the Chinese government's decision to issue stapled visas to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir.
If Indian concerns do not elicit a positive response from Beijing, Delhi will have no option but to conclude that China's new visa practice reflects a significant evolution in Beijing's Kashmir policy.
The very purpose of the military exchanges between India and China, for example, is to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border, pending the resolution of the territorial dispute.
Why then is Beijing spurning military confidence-building to make a political point in J&K? Has the continuous contestation of Indian sovereignty in J&K become so important for Beijing that it is prepared to rupture an expanding bilateral relationship? These are the questions that Delhi is asking itself.
In our obsession with Pakistan and the emphasis on "bilateralism" when it comes to discussing Kashmir, we tend to forget how China looms so large on J&K.
Until recently China's importance to Kashmir was reflected in three facts. China is in occupation of 38,000 sq km of territory in the Ladakh region that connects the original state of J&K with two Chinese provinces, Tibet and Xinjiang.
Beijing also controls another tract of about 5,000 sq km in Shaksgam valley that Pakistan ceded to China under a 1963 treaty. The Chinese People's Liberation Army spent vast amounts of blood and treasure in building the Karakoram Highway through Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan during the '70s.
As it reflects on the recent Chinese moves on J&K, India must come to terms with a number of new trends. As a rising power, China has begun to assert its territorial claims far more vigorously, as seen most recently in the South China Sea.
Its rapid growth over the last three decades has allowed Beijing to project its economic power across its frontiers into the neighbouring countries. As a consequence, China's capacity to influence decisions of its neighbours all along its periphery -- from the Russian far east to Central Asia through the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia -- has increased.
In the last few years, India has warily watched Chinese activism all across the Great Himalayas in Burma, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Pakistan. Until now India's challenge has been about managing an economic and diplomatic contest with Beijing.
The new questions that Delhi confronts are somewhat different. Is China's rising economic power and growing political influence across the Himalayas morphing into a threat to India's territorial sovereignty in J&K? Has China abandoned its three-decade-old cautious approach to J&K?
During the '50s, China avoided taking positions on the India-Pakistan dispute over J&K. Despite the positive Sino-Indian relations and India's acceptance of the Chinese claim to Tibet, China did not support India's sovereignty over J&K. But Beijing did not support Pakistan either.
As Sino-Indian ties deteriorated from the late '50s, China tilted decisively towards Pakistan and after the 1962 war with India it started supporting self-determination for J&K.
As Deng Xiaoping sought a peaceful environment for his economic reforms from the late '70s, the Chinese position on Kashmir acquired some balance, especially after Delhi and Beijing made an effort to normalise relations.
The latest Chinese moves suggest that in the fourth phase of its Kashmir policy, Beijing is less concerned about maintaining a balance between Delhi and Rawalpindi. While its new positions do help Pakistan in a tactical sense, India wonders if China wants to become a full-fledged party to the J&K dispute by contesting India's sovereignty.
Add to this, China's expanding presence in Gilgit-Baltistan, its plans to modernise the Karakoram Highway and link it to the Gwadar port in Pakistan, and its search for new access routes into Afghanistan. All these developments make India wonder if it must redo its sums in Kashmir.
India can certainly retaliate to China's moves on J&K, with visa denials of its own and stapled visas for Chinese citizens from across the borders in Xinjiang and Tibet. Such diplomatic tit-for-tat may make Delhi feel good but will not address its new China problem on its frontiers.
To deal with the rising Chinese power in Kashmir and other frontiers, India needs a long-term strategy that focuses on a rapid upgrade of India's own infrastructure on the borders, massive economic investments to develop the border regions all along our northern frontiers, strengthening cross-border economic cooperation with our smaller neighbours, and modernising India's military capabilities.
For its part, Delhi must first try and get Beijing to see the dangerous consequences of its moves on J&K. India must also offer to engage China in a comprehensive dialogue on stabilising our shared periphery.
From Balochistan to Burma -- through Afghanistan, FATA, Xinjiang, Kashmir, Tibet, Nepal and the Northeast -- there is great turbulence. India's preference must be to cooperate with Beijing in bringing peace and prosperity to this region.
If Beijing, however, continues to challenge India's territorial sovereignty across the Great Himalayas, even a reluctant UPA government -- widely seen as weak and lacking the political will on national defence -- might be forced to pick up the gauntlet.
Source: Indian Express
K.Venugopal
#1
Tuesday, 31 August 2010 10:14:18
To the question as to what India can do about China's aggression on India's integrity, India must immediately and unambiguously put across the message that however powerful China is India shall not go down without a fight and saying so India should deploy its nuclear arsenal upon China with the implication that even if India is completely destroyed, not much of China and its protégé Pakistan would survive either. We must put across the message of assured mutual annihilation. Therefore India has to get cracking on the nuclear arsenal front to hone its nuclear capabilities.
http://news.in.msn.com/international/article.aspx?cp-documentid=4325926&page=0
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